The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (4) , 1057-1090
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555420
Abstract
This paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations. In each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting. A basic trKeywords
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