A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries
- 1 November 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 37 (2) , 259-294
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0843
Abstract
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All Related Versions
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