An overview of incentive contracting
- 30 June 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 83 (2) , 297-346
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(95)00059-3
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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