Game-theoretic modeling and control of a military air operation
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
- Vol. 37 (4) , 1393-1405
- https://doi.org/10.1109/7.976974
Abstract
An attrition-type discrete-time dynamic model is formulated for two opposing forces, labeled Blue and Red, engaged in a military air operation. The Blue force consists of combat air units and its objective is to destroy a fixed target, such as an airport or a bridge, which Is being defended by the Red force. The Red force consists of ground troops and air defense units. We model the objective functions for each side and identify the associated constraints on the control and state variables. We employ a two-level hierarchy of command and control for each force. An example scenario illustrating the implementation of this approach using concepts from non-zero sum dynamic game theory is presented.Keywords
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