Psychiatric commitment and involuntary hospitalization: An ethical perspective

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
As a psychiatrist, I have focused in this paper on the medical model view of commitment. Directed against the medical model is the civil liberties position, mostly put forward by attorneys, which values autonomy over beneficence and sees psychiatric decision-making as biased, imprecise, and too paternalistic. Like the moral principles they champion, neither of these positions is "wrong." The tension between them is inevitable and sometimes beneficial. The conflict is inevitable because the proponents differ in their missions and how they think. Attorneys (and philosophers) think in terms of the general case, of classes of situations, whereas psychiatrists focus on individuals as unique. Chodoff has also pointed out that the medical model is a utilitarian one, i.e. the morality of an act is determined by, on balance, whether it increases the good for the individual or society. The civil liberties position, on the other hand, is a deontological one, i.e. the end does not justify the means; some moral principles must be considered even if they do not lead to maximally good outcomes. This conflict between positions can be ultimately beneficial, if we recognize that each is fighting for a good. As a society, we should expect psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to try their utmost to treat the mentally ill, and attorneys to protect their rights. When we view it as such a moral dilemma, "we are confronted not with melodrama, a contest of right against wrong, but rather with tragedy, a conflict of one right--to be at physical liberty--against another right--to be free dehumanizing disease."