Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of Judicial Enforcement and Other Institutions
Preprint
- 1 June 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Although much progress has been made in understanding the importance of institutional failure in explaining creditors` unwillingness to finance firms and individuals, the pertinent empirical literature still has an important shortcoming: it does not separate out the effects of legal protection, accounting standards and judicial enforcement. This paper tries to overcome this gap by analyzing the discrete effect of the quality of judicial enforcement on the performance of credit markets.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International EvidenceSSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- Credit Markets in Brazil: The Role of Judicial Enforcement and Other InstitutionsSSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- Law and FinanceJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- Legal Determinants of External FinanceThe Journal of Finance, 1997
- Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others PoorJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1996
- The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and ReformThe World Bank Economic Review, 1994
- Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a TestThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
- THE ROLE OF GROUPS AND CREDIT COOPERATIVES IN RURAL LENDINGThe World Bank Research Observer, 1990