Passive Shareholders and Active Managers: An Empirical Test of Admati and Pfleiderer's Hypothesis
- 1 January 2007
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Admati and Pfleiderer (2006) demonstrate that under some conditions, linking CEO pay to share price performance may aggravate agency conflicts. Two fundamentalKeywords
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