The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery
- 1 September 1974
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 41 (3) , 247-295
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288592
Abstract
In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No. 2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself.Keywords
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