Private Value Perturbations and Informational Advantage in Common Value Auctions
- 1 January 2005
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze the value of being better informed than one's rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. Standard models of these auctions do not pinKeywords
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