Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- 1 June 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 115-145
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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