Existence of a ?structurally stable? equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
- 1 January 1986
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 51 (3) , 267-284
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128877
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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