International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?
- 31 December 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy
- Vol. 53 (1) , 361-377
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2231(01)00036-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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