Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions
Top Cited Papers
- 7 April 2006
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 312 (5770) , 60-61
- https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1126398
Abstract
Given the choice, people prefer institutional arrangements in which those who overconsume common-property resources are punished compared to those in which they go free.Keywords
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