Admissibility and common belief
- 1 February 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 42 (2) , 208-234
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00551-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 32 references indexed in Scilit:
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