Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality

24 July 2003

journal article
research article
Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization

Vol. 57 (3) , 551-586
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303573039

Abstract

What explains the changes in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality? I argue that IMF conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers. The IMF regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances. As a result, these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the IMF and the design of its conditionality programs. I consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier, private financial institutions, on IMF conditionality. “Conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements, coded according to their terms, and two case studies.”

Keywords

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