INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES, SHARE‐PRICE BASED INCENTIVES AND MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOUR
- 1 March 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-21
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1996.tb00001.x
Abstract
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