An Empirical Examination of the Minimax Hypothesis
- 1 April 1989
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Quarterly
- Vol. 17 (2) , 153-162
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x8901700203
Abstract
In this article we examine empirically the minimax hypothesis. The hypothesis holds that individuals are motivated to incur the minimal costs of voting in order to avoid the maximum regret: Their preferred candidate losing by a single vote. The results of our study suggest that a substantial number of people apparently do employ a minimax decision-making process. Over one-third of the individuals interviewed reported sometimes worrying that if they abstain from voting their favorite candidate might lose. In addition, these respondents were significantly more likely than those who expressed no worry to claim they voted in 1984 and to say they planned to vote in 1986. And perhaps most intriguing, further analysis suggests that individuals may be more likely to employ minimax decision making than expected utility decision making.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Collective ActionPublished by Project MUSE ,1982
- Some Problems in Testing Two Rational Models of ParticipationAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1976
- Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and DancingAmerican Political Science Review, 1975
- The Paradox of Minimax RegretAmerican Political Science Review, 1975
- Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?American Political Science Review, 1975
- The Paradox of Not Voting: CommentAmerican Political Science Review, 1975
- On the Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New ProposalAmerican Political Science Review, 1975
- The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic AnalysisAmerican Political Science Review, 1974
- A Theory of the Calculus of VotingAmerican Political Science Review, 1968
- A Theory of the Calculus of VotingAmerican Political Science Review, 1968