COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND FATAL FIREARM ACCIDENTS*
- 1 August 1985
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Criminology
- Vol. 23 (3) , 401-416
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1985.tb00347.x
Abstract
This paper offers an explanation for rates of fatal firearm accidents in terms of confidence in collectively provided justice and security. It describes the collective security model and presents an analysis of time‐series data from Detroit which supports it: accidental gunshot deaths varied positively with violent crime and civil disturbances and negatively with the allocation of resources to the police. Finally, it discusses some implications for research design and social policy.Keywords
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