Control Mechanism Or Deliberative Democracy?

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Abstract
One of the most striking features of contemporary EU governance is the ubiquity of Commission and member-state committees known under the rubric of "comitology." The significance of these committees, however, remains a matter of dispute, with two distinct theoretical images of comitology being put forward in the literature. The first of these approaches, drawn from sociological institutionalism and constructivism, suggests that EU committees provide a forum in which national and supranational experts meet and deliberate in a search for the most efficient solutions to common policy problems. A second view, derived from rational choice theory, depicts comitology committees as control mechanisms designed by EU member governments to supervise the Commission in its executive duties. This article engages in a direct competitive test of these two approaches, examining the empirical record of institutional choice of comitology committees and demonstrating that the weight of both quantitative and qualitative evidence supports rationalist hypotheses. Deliberation may well take place under certain conditions within comitology committees, but it is likely that such deliberation takes place only within a relatively narrow domain, and under conditions yet to be identified.