Intentionality, Pluralism, and Redescription
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 34 (4) , 493-505
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393104269197
Abstract
Donald Davidson, and others, have sometimes claimed that the subject matter of social science properly consists only of intentional actions. The author disputes this claim and explores an example drawn from social psychology that shows that some social scientific phenomena cannot be explained unless they are redescribed in nonintentional language.Keywords
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