Mutations, perturbations and evolutionarily stable strategies
- 1 March 1982
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Applied Probability
- Vol. 19 (1) , 204-209
- https://doi.org/10.2307/3213929
Abstract
The changes in diversity of competitive strategies in a Maynard Smith population model with mixed strategies are related to the changes in population mean strategy. The effects of slight mutations in strategy frequencies, and of slight perturbations of the contest payoff rules are then investigated, and found to increase and decrease diversity respectively (to a third-order approximation). A relation among mutational effects, payoff perturbation effects and stable population diversity is suggested.Keywords
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