Domestic Opposition and Foreign War
- 1 September 1990
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 84 (3) , 747-765
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1962765
Abstract
Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.Keywords
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