Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
- 1 March 1979
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Applied Probability
- Vol. 16 (1) , 76-83
- https://doi.org/10.2307/3213376
Abstract
A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.Keywords
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