Decline of electoral turnout: The case of Norway

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Abstract
Why do sudden changes occur in electoral turnout from one election to the next? This article proposes two general hypotheses as explanations for declining turnout. The first hypothesis draws on rational choice theory, and is based on the assumption that elections are devices for the selection of governments. It states that abstention is rational when government alternatives are unclear. The second hypothesis implies that non‐voting is a result of social‐psychological mechanisms, and suggests that voters abstain in situations of disagreement with their own party concerning some important issue. The hypothesis predicts that strong identifiers under cross‐pressure are more inclined to stay home than weak identifiers and non identifiers. In using the 1993 parliamentary election in Norway as a test case, the analysis suggests that the application of a rational choice approach is fruitful for studying electoral turnout. Because of the absence of clear‐cut government alternatives voter involvement was low in the election and people did not distinguish much between the various political platforms offered to them. The second hypothesis of disagreement with own party received only limited support. The differences due to cross‐pressures are not very big, and the prediction that strong identifiers under cross pressure are more inclined to stay home was not supported. Altogether, our case study suggests that very few costs are involved in changing partisanship and that party identification reflects a strong cognitive rather than affective aspect.

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