The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics
Open Access
- 1 February 2005
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in The Annals of Applied Probability
- Vol. 15 (1B)
- https://doi.org/10.1214/105051604000000837
Abstract
Fudenberg and Harris' stochastic version of the classical replicator dynamics is considered. The behavior of this diffusion process in the presence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is investigated. Moreover, extinction of dominated strategies and stochastic stability of strict Nash equilibria are studied. The general results are illustrated in connection with a discrete war of attrition. A persistence result for the maximum effort strategy is obtained and an explicit expression for the evolutionarily stable strategy is derived.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/105051604000000837 in the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.orgKeywords
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