Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance
- 1 April 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 9 (2) , 107-185
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00237.x
Abstract
Understanding governance in the world's democracies requires study of the political institutions — the chief executives, the bureaucracies, and the legislatures — most involved in national policymaking. There are many approaches to the study of these institutions. This article examines the potential of an approach which is relatively unfamiliar to most students of governance: the development of formal mathematical theories of political institutions. The costs and benefits of this approach are discussed, various types of formal theories are surveyed, and a variety of possible applications to some central problems of governance are described.This publication has 108 references indexed in Scilit:
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