The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
- 1 September 2005
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 73 (5) , 1431-1475
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00626.x
Abstract
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