CAREER CONCERNS: INCENTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS LEARNING IN LABOUR MARKETS
- 1 September 1992
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 6 (3) , 251-270
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1992.tb00152.x
Abstract
Models of career concerns provide a framework for analysing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity, and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximise the financial return to a firm's owner. This survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns (hidden action and hidden information), and discusses some extensions of these models. Applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behaviour and the form of labour market institutions are emphasised.Keywords
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