Robustness in Signaling Games
- 1 December 2007
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 74 (5) , 839-847
- https://doi.org/10.1086/525625
Abstract
The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a number of other evolutionary dynamics.Keywords
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