Is a Convertible Bond Call Really Bad News?
- 1 July 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Business
- Vol. 74 (3) , 459-476
- https://doi.org/10.1086/321934
Abstract
We test and reject the hypothesis that managers call in‐the‐money convertibles when they view a decline in the value of the firm as likely. Inconsistent with this view, we find that insiders generally buy equity before conversion‐forcing calls. Also, analysts tend to raise their earnings forecasts following a call. Thus, our evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that the price decline immediately following conversion‐forcing calls is a purely transitory decline caused by the anticipated increase in the supply of equity. Indeed, our evidence confirms that the initial price decline is reversed in the weeks following the announcement.Keywords
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