Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information
Open Access
- 31 January 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Review of Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 36-64
- https://doi.org/10.1006/redy.1998.0034
Abstract
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