Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multi-user networks
- 19 November 2002
- proceedings article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Abstract
Considers a multi-user network that is shared by noncooperative users. Each user sets up virtual paths that optimize its own, selfish, performance measure. This measure accounts for both the guaranteed call level quality of service, as well as for the cost incurred for reserving the resource. The interaction between the user strategies is formalized as a game. The authors show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, and that it possesses a certain fairness property. They investigate the dynamics of this game, and prove convergence to the Nash equilibrium of both a Gauss-Seidel scheme and a Jacobi scheme. They extend their study to various general network topologies.Keywords
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