Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2001
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 116 (3) , 901-932
- https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
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