Imperfect Knowledge, Adaptive Learning and the Bias Against Activist Monetary Policies
Preprint
- 1 January 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
When the economy is subject to recurrent structural shifts, the monetary authority cannot credibly commit to a systematic approach to policy, since consistencyKeywords
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