Are Performance Measures Other Than Price Important to CEO Incentives?
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We examine whether publicly available performance measures other than stock price are economically significant in explaining changes in CEOs' firm-specific wealKeywords
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