Working Memory Capacity and a Notorious Brain Teaser
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 53 (2) , 123-131
- https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.53.1.123
Abstract
The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is an intriguing example of the discrepancy between people's intuitions and normative reasoning. This study examines whether the notorious difficulty of the MHD is associated with limitations in working memory resources. Experiment 1 and 2 examined the link between MHD reasoning and working memory capacity. Experiment 3 tested the role of working memory experimentally by burdening the executive resources with a secondary task. Results showed that participants who solved the MHD correctly had a significantly higher working memory capacity than erroneous responders. Correct responding also decreased under secondary task load. Findings indicate that working memory capacity plays a key role in overcoming salient intuitions and selecting the correct switching response during MHD reasoning.Keywords
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