WHY HOLD‐UPS OCCUR: THE SELF‐ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 34 (3) , 444-463
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01388.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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