Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
- 1 June 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 57 (1) , 197-221
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80048-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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