The cohesion deficit in Structural Fund policy

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Abstract
The Structural Funds of the European Union have proved to be blunt policy instruments in serving their stated purpose of enhancing both economic and social cohesion. Cohesion policy is embedded in a context of inter-governmental bargaining on budgetary allocations which structures the core of the policy around the yardstick of GDP per capita. This complicates the targeting of the funds on real deprivation. Moreover, a pork barrel logic in policy implementation favours better organized and advantaged groups within regions. This situation, as well as the growing saliency of inequality issues at EU level, have raised concern with the question of 'who benefits?' from cohesion policy.The European Commission, some member states and local actors are responding by developing efforts to tackle deprivation as experienced by EU citizens locally. However, they face important constraints in doing so, which raises broader questions about political representation and access to decision-making in the Union.

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