U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms
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- 27 August 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier
- Vol. 72 (3) , 519-553
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00208-3
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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