Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views
- 30 April 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 37 (2) , 267-283
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(96)90037-9
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