Narco‐traffic and guerrilla warfare: A new symbiosis
- 1 November 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence Economics
- Vol. 3 (4) , 263-274
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10430719208404736
Abstract
This paper considers the role of drug lords in narco‐trafficking. The model is of a three‐person game with a two‐stage structure. The first stage is the war between the guerrillas and the government, while the second stage is the relationship between the participants in the guerrilla war and the drug lords, where the drug lords act as Stackelberg leaders with the government and the guerrillas acting as Stackelberg followers. The dynamics of the model imply that the drug lords can achieve their own preferred outcome by appropriate transfers to one side or the other in the guerrilla war.Keywords
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