On the Nature of Fair Behavior
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- 1 January 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 41 (1) , 20-26
- https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/41.1.20
Abstract
This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.Keywords
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