An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- 1 February 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 3 (1) , 25-59
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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