Advice and Monitoring: Venture Financing with Multiple Tasks
Preprint
- 1 January 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper focuses on the dual role of venture capitalists as both advisors and monitors in entrepreneurial firms. It proposes a distinction between these two tKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 35 references indexed in Scilit:
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