Dimensions Underlying Economic Policymaking in the Early and Later Burger Courts

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Abstract
This article examines the voting behavior of the justices in nonunanimous economic cases decided during three terms of the early and three terms of the later Burger Court. After employing factor analysis, which disclosed three principal dimensions underlying the justices' voting behavior in the first court and two in the second, we carefully examined cases scoring most positively and those scoring most negatively on each of the factors and analyzed the outcomes associated with the decision of each case. The principal dimension underlying the decision of economic cases by the early Burger Court appeared to be economic liberalism-conservatism. Also implicated as lesser factors were deference to the discretion of administrative agencies and either attitude toward business or economic due process. By contrast, the justices' voting behavior in economic cases during the later Burger Court appeared to be best explained by regard for federalism and only secondarily by economic liberalism-conservatism. Only analysis of the Court's future terms can determine whether the dimensions underlying the justices' voting behavior in economic cases have undergone a restructuring or whether their voting behavior will remain fluid.