Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
- 1 June 2000
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 31-53
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01669206
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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