Lockups Revisited
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We present a theoretical model that shows how the incentives of insiders, underwriters, and investors can interact with the nature of the firm's assets to explaKeywords
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