Abstract
Social movements are commonly regarded either as irrational responses to social tension or as rational attempts to introduce social innovations. In the latter case, the aims of the movement are necessarily the main focus of attention. But the example of the Christian Socialist movement illustrates the fact that the aims of social movements are flexible and that specific aims may emerge only after the formation of the movement itself; thus to focus on the aims of the movement as the cause of its existence is inappropriate. It is however not necessary to conclude from this that the expressed aims of a movement are merely justifications of irrational actions; aims are caused, and partly by the activities of the movement, but they are also causal. What is needed is a dialectical model of the process of social movements representing the interaction of ideology and action and not implying the necessary priority of either, involving an image of man as both acted upon and acting. The case of the Christian Socialist movement provides the basis for the construction of such a model.

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