Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets
- 1 February 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 27 (1) , 75-96
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(85)90007-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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